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ADR, DYNAMIC (IN)JUSTICE, AND ACHIEVING 
ACCESS:  A FORECLOSURE CRISIS CASE STUDY 
Lydia Nussbaum* 
INTRODUCTION 
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. 
—Justice Anthony M. Kennedy1 
The query of this provocative Symposium, Achieving Access to Justice 
Through ADR:  Fact or Fiction?, prompts two important questions:  what do 
we mean by “justice,” and what does it look like to “achieve justice”?  Of all 
the conceptions of justice and access to justice,2 the one I find most 
compelling comes from Marc Galanter.3  Galanter points out that justice is 
not a fixed pie; instead, justice is achieved by pushing back against injustice, 
which, like it or not, is forever changing with humans’ capacity for 
innovation as new discoveries, changing societal norms, and evolving 
expectations precipitate new problems, needs, or unmet wants.4 
This insight from Galanter helps us better understand how alternative 
dispute resolution5 (ADR) processes engage questions of justice and access 
 
*  Professor of Law and Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, William S. 
Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  This Article was prepared for 
the Symposium entitled Achieving Access to Justice Through ADR:  Fact or Fiction?, hosted 
by the Fordham Law Review, Fordham Law School’s Conflict Resolution and ADR Program, 
and the National Center for Access to Justice on November 1, 2019, at Fordham University 
School of Law.  I am grateful to Ellen Deason, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Heather Scheiwe 
Kulp, Robert Rubinson, Ellen Waldman, and Jean Sternlight for helping me develop and 
clarify my ideas, as well as Lena Rieke for her invaluable research assistance.  Additional 
thanks go to Lauren Knoke, Executive Symposia Editor for the Fordham Law Review and all 
of her colleagues on the Fordham Law Review for hosting an outstanding program.  A special 
thanks to Jennifer Lei for her editing assistance.  All errors are my own. 
 
 1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (delivering the opinion of the U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
 2. For definitions of “access to justice,” see infra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 3. See generally Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social 
Capability, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (2010). 
 4. Id. at 125. 
 5. The term “alternative dispute resolution” is not particularly helpful as a descriptor, 
because it clumps together a range of diverse dispute resolution processes—mediation, 
arbitration, negotiation, etc.—each of which could not be more different than the next.  I will, 
however, hold to the conventions of the field and use the term ADR to mean dispute resolution 
processes that are not formal, public, judicial adjudication.  More specifically, the ADR 
processes to which I refer are arbitration, mediation, settlement conferencing, etc.—whether 
privately contracted for or accessed in connection with court litigation or administrative 
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to justice.  Indeed, to counter this “moving frontier”6 of injustice—or, put 
another way, to access justice—requires a diversity of approaches.  This 
diversity should include ADR processes whose features enable them to 
respond nimbly in a dynamic system of justice. 
While ADR processes offer methods for pushing back against injustice, 
they too, like any other human invention, can introduce new problems.  
Because an ADR process is just that, a process and not an event isolated unto 
itself,7 it can be only as “just” as the system in which it operates.  When 
introduced in new contexts, the procedural design of ADR needs to adapt to 
avoid leading to new forms of injustice.  Thus, in the same way that justice 
should be understood as dynamic, ADR as a means to access justice should 
also be conceived as dynamic, evolving, and in need of continual adjustment. 
The dynamic system of justice and ADR’s evolving role within that system 
are aptly illustrated through the history of the foreclosure crisis.  The rise of 
a secondary mortgage market and its subsequent collapse presented new 
kinds of injustice, in an unprecedented volume, for which the existing legal 
system was wholly unprepared.8  The deployment of foreclosure mediation 
and other facilitated negotiation processes created new avenues for 
homeowners and investors to achieve justice by avoiding foreclosure through 
a process that enhanced communication, preserved the dignity of 
homeowners, and protected trillions of dollars of economic investment.9  The 
design of these foreclosure ADR programs evolved to protect against the 
systemic injustices at play in the foreclosure crisis.10 
This Article proceeds in two parts.  Part I argues for a dynamic, rather than 
fixed, conception of access to justice.  It then explores how ADR processes, 
when placed in this dynamic framework, can create new forms of injustice 
and intensify preexisting ones.  Part II presents a case study from the 
foreclosure crisis to illustrate how the features of ADR processes are 
especially well suited to respond to dynamic injustices.  It further 
demonstrates how ADR design must evolve to respond to the dynamic 
system of (in)justice in which ADR processes operate. 
I.  ADR AND ITS ROLE IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
The notion of “access to justice” has a rich history and many dimensions.11  
At its narrowest, access to justice focuses on the “access” component—or the 
 
dispute resolution procedures—that were integrated into the U.S. legal system during the 
twentieth century. 
 6. See Galanter, supra note 3, at 125 (“Advances in human capability and rising 
expectations result in a moving frontier of injustice.”). 
 7. I am grateful to Heather Scheiwe Kulp for making this important point during the 
Symposium discussion. Discussion with Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Alt. Dispute Resolution 
Coordinator, N.H. Judicial Branch, at the Fordham Law Review Symposium:  Achieving 
Access to Justice Through ADR:  Fact or Fiction? (Nov. 1, 2019). 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office for Access to Justice identifies three guiding 
principles for access to justice:  (1) “Promoting Accessibility—eliminating barriers that 
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ability for all people, not just the rich and powerful, to access “civil legal 
justice.”12  And then there are the broader notions of access to justice that 
focus on “justice,” asking whether what is accessed is substantively “just” or 
whether a system of resolving disputes leads to satisfying remedies for harms 
suffered.13 
But trying to fit ADR into either of these meanings of access to justice 
seems unhelpful.  The narrower conception of access to justice, which 
prioritizes access as its goal, inherently renders alternatives to the civil legal 
justice system inferior because these ADR processes sidestep either the 
formal adjudication or prescribed legal remedies (sometimes both) that the 
civil legal system provides.14  And the broader conception of access to justice 
 
prevent people from understanding and exercising their rights”; (2) “Ensuring Fairness—
delivering fair and just outcomes for all parties, including those facing financial and other 
disadvantages”; and (3) “Increasing Efficiency—delivering fair and just outcomes effectively, 
without waste or duplication.” See Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES, 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atj [https://perma.cc/6WXH-ZU8Q] (last visited Apr. 12, 
2020).  Fordham Law School’s own National Center for Access to Justice defines access to 
justice as “having a fair chance to be heard, regardless of who you are, where you live, or how 
much money you have.” See Why Access to Justice Matters, JUST. INDEX 2016, 
https://justiceindex.org/our-vision/#site-navigation [https://perma.cc/9R43-EEE5] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020).  It means that a person can learn about her rights and then protect her 
interests through a neutral and nondiscriminatory, formal or informal, process that determines 
the facts, applies the rule of law, and enforces the result. Id.  
 12. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3–10 (2004).  For Deborah Rhode, the 
“access” part of access to justice includes access to lawyers who can translate parties’ 
grievances into legal claims and then advocate on their behalf, to a judicial system that is a 
forum for hearing those claims, and to the remedies prescribed under law. Id. at 20, 117–21.  
For a discussion on whether it is right to assume that access to justice should mean access to 
law, access to legal services, and therefore access to lawyers, see generally David Luban, 
Optimism, Skepticism, and Access to Justice, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 495 (2016). 
 13. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, DÆDALUS, Winter 2019, at 49, 50.  Credit 
for making this distinction in emphasis—on either the “access” or the substantive “justice” 
components of “access to justice”—goes to Jean Sternlight, who made this observation during 
a breakout session at a June 2019 conference at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law. 
Discussion with Jean Sternlight, Founding Dir. of the Saltman Ctr. for Conflict Resolution 
and the Michael and Sonja Saltman Professor of Law, William S. Boyd Sch. of Law, at the 
Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law Conference:  Appreciating Our Legacy and 
Engaging the Future:  An International Conference for Dispute Resolution Teachers, Scholars, 
and Leaders (June 18, 2019). 
 14. Arguably, the broad institutionalization of these ADR processes makes them an 
integral part of our civil legal system rather than “alternatives.”  Nevertheless, the critiques of 
dispute resolution, noting that it is not judge-led or publicly determined, raise important 
concerns. See Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes Within the 
Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L. REV. 282, 288 (1993) 
(discussing the risk that alternatives to adjudication may result in “second class justice”); 
Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 146–47 (2005) 
(responding to power critiques of mediation); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law?:  Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 
569–72 (2007) (explaining the critiques of ADR processes in the United States).  Others have 
noted that the adversarial legal system is not necessarily the best or only avenue for achieving 
justice. See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:  
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 67–69 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 
1979) (acknowledging that “encouraging the ventilation of grievances” by establishing new 
modes of dispute resolution may not be a good thing); see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, 
Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice:  Jurisdictional Principles for 
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necessitates projecting one’s own value system to determine whether 
remedies are satisfying or unsatisfying, just or unjust.15  Rather than 
shoehorn ADR into one of these restrictive meanings of “access to justice,” 
consider instead an alternative theory of justice and, therefore, access to 
justice, provided by Marc Galanter. 
A.  Access to Justice Is Dynamic, Not Fixed 
Marc Galanter offers a trenchant insight into the access to justice reform 
movement.16  He observes that the access to justice agenda, whether 
formulated narrowly or broadly, lacks an essential temporal dimension.17 
[A]chievement of the “justice” in [access to justice] entails the vindication 
of rights and entitlements set out in the existing law and its best institutional 
practice—no small thing!  But when we add a temporal dimension, we 
render the notion of Access to Justice at once more capacious and more 
diffuse.  Justice is no longer, if it ever was, stable and determinate, but fluid, 
moving, and labile. . . .  The justice to which we seek access is the negation 
or correction of injustice.  But there is not a fixed sum of injustice in the 
world that is diminished by every achievement of justice.  The sphere of 
perceived injustice expands dynamically with the growth of human 
knowledge, with advances in technical feasibility, and with rising 
expectations of amenity and safety.18 
The nature of (in)justice changes constantly, and therefore injustice will 
never be eradicated nor justice fully achieved because “people are capable of 
identifying or inventing new problems as quickly as the old ones are 
solved. . . .  [T]he very same human capabilities that create solutions for 
 
Process Choice, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 893, 896 & n.4 (discussing contemporary concerns about 
the legal system’s institutional capacity to respond to all would-be litigants); Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1537–39, 1546–47 (2009) 
(examining how access to lawyers does not result in access to the legal system or increased 
delivery of justice); William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes:  Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 645 (1980) (discussing 
the many ways in which lawyers “shape disputes to fit their own interests rather than those of 
their clients”); Katherine R. Kruse, Learning from Practice:  What ADR Needs from a Theory 
of Justice, 5 NEV. L.J. 389, 391 (2004) (discussing the problem with romanticizing the judicial 
system and the problem with assuming that lawyers are always righteous actors). 
 15. As Ellen Deason discussed in her contribution to this Symposium, the idea of justice 
is deeply personal and highly contextual:  access to “whose justice”?  This critique is valid not 
only for examining whether ADR helps improve justice but also for examining any other 
assertions about whether a particular system is just. See Discussion with Ellen E. Deason, 
Joanne Wharton Murphy and Classes of 1965 and 1973 Professor of Law, Ohio State Univ. 
Moritz Coll. of Law, at the Fordham Law Review Symposium:  Achieving Access to Justice 
Through ADR:  Fact or Fiction? (Nov. 1, 2019); see also Mauro Cappelletti, Bryant Garth & 
Nicolò Trocker, Access to Justice:  Variations and Continuity of a World-Wide Movement, 54 
REV. JUR. U. P.R. 221, 222–23 (1985); Felstiner et al., supra note 14, at 634 (recognizing that 
injurious experiences are perceived and valued differently and that the way in which a person 
perceives, values, and attaches meaning to an injurious experience is unique and highly 
individualized); Luban, supra note 12, at 512–13 (discussing whether access to justice, at the 
micro and macro levels, means access to law). 
 16. See generally Galanter, supra note 3. 
 17. Id. at 123–24. 
 18. Id. at 124. 
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existing problems—by fulfilling existing needs and wants—discover or 
create new needs, new wants, and new problems.”19  One need look no 
further than new technologies, like cell phones and artificial reproductive 
technologies, for examples of human ingenuity that, in creating solutions for 
certain problems, introduce a host of new troubles, like violations of privacy 
and eugenics. 
The idea that access to justice is fluid, dynamic, and forever changing with 
expanding human knowledge provides a useful framework for understanding 
ADR’s role in achieving access to justice.  As the next sections discuss, ADR 
processes typify the kind of human creativity needed to respond to a moving 
frontier of injustice; yet, simultaneously, these processes can introduce new 
needs, problems, and injustices that must be addressed. 
B.  ADR Enables Dynamic Access to Justice 
The modern ADR and access to justice movements emerged together in 
the 1970s as part of a push to reform the U.S. legal system by improving its 
accountability and responsiveness to all people.20  A growing recognition 
that the formal litigation process failed most people propelled a reform 
movement.21  The movement focused on identifying ways to help those who 
had been harmed find better quality justice faster.22  Reformers thought that 
ADR processes could serve as new, alternative avenues through which 
disputants could reach just resolutions.23  Offering disputants “process 
pluralism,” a menu of different processes that could be used to address 
disputants’ different goals, served as an integral part of the access to justice 
mission.24 
A desire both to expedite the delivery of justice and enhance the quality of 
justice in a legal system riddled with barriers drove the institutionalization of 
ADR.25  The argument was as follows:  if accessing justice through formal 
 
 19. Id. at 125. 
 20. Id. at 117 (characterizing ADR, access to justice, and the dispute perspective in legal 
studies as “intellectual triplets” born from the same big idea); see Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-door Courthouse at Twenty:  Fait Accompli, Failed 
Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 309–19 (1996); see 
also Cappelletti, supra note 14, at 294 (identifying ADR as “a major component” of “the 
search for, and growth of,” access to justice).  For a history of the Pound Conferences and 
their influence on the development of ADR, see generally Lara Traum & Brian Farkas, The 
History and Legacy of the Pound Conferences, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 677 (2017). 
 21. Cappelletti, supra note 14, at 283–88 (establishing three waves of the access to justice 
reform movement—a first wave focusing on overcoming economic obstacles to justice, a 
second wave focusing on organizational barriers to collective or societal justice, and a third 
wave, which includes ADR, focusing on overcoming procedural barriers to justice). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See generally Frank E. A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution:  An 
Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture:  A Tale of 
Innovation Co-opted or the Law of ADR, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6–13 (1991) (noting and 
responding to the different justifications for ADR as “quantitative-efficiency claims” and 
“qualitative-justice claims”).  The Disputes Processing Research Program at the University of 
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litigation was a narrow path accessible only to a wealthy minority, then ADR 
could open the judicial process to larger segments of the population.26  In 
contrast to court adjudication, ADR processes could be more informal, with 
fewer (if any, depending on which kind of ADR process) restrictive 
procedural and evidentiary rules, making them easier to navigate, less costly, 
and, in theory, more efficient.27  Further, ADR processes could provide 
procedural infrastructure where there previously was none; for example, 
mediation offers a structured process, overseen by a neutral third party, for 
negotiating parties who might not otherwise be successful if left to their own 
devices.28 
Added to these “quantitative-efficiency” justifications for ADR as a 
mechanism for increasing access to justice are the “qualitative-justice” 
arguments.29  For this latter group of arguments, the thinking was that modes 
of dispute resolution other than adversarialism and its binary outcomes might 
be better suited to the “complexities of both modern life and modern 
lawsuits.”30  Because individuals’ conceptions of justice are highly 
personalized, a one-size legal remedy may not fit all.  ADR processes, many 
of which are party-driven, could result in more satisfying outcomes than 
litigation.31 
This notion of personalized justice adheres especially to those processes 
that facilitate negotiations, such as mediation and conciliation.32  These ADR 
processes can enable parties to craft the content of their own settlements and 
 
Wisconsin commissioned five papers that provide a more robust discussion of the 
“production” and “quality” arguments around ADR. See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, 
Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution:  Taxonomies and Anti-taxonomies of Quality 
Arguments, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 335 (1989); John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute 
Processing:  We Do Not Know What We Think and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66 
DENV. U. L. REV. 499 (1989); David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 381 
(1989); Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship:  
From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 
437 (1989); Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Processes and Outcomes:  
Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 419 (1989). 
 26. Cappelletti, supra note 14, at 287; see also Rubinson, supra note 14, at 144–52 
(proposing the concept of “mass justice mediation” and what it would take to do it “right”). 
 27. Bush, supra note 14, at 895–907 (detailing the different views on judicial reform); 
Sander, supra note 23, at 1. 
 28. Lydia Nussbaum, Mediation as Regulation:  Expanding State Governance over 
Private Disputes, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 361, 404 (detailing the different ways in which 
mediation can increase efficiency of negotiations). 
 29. But cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25 (explaining and criticizing common 
qualitative-justice arguments). 
 30. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 9 (1996). 
 31. Cappelletti, supra note 14, at 289 (noting that sometimes “conciliatory (or ‘co-
existential’) justice is able to produce results which, far from being ‘second class,’ are better, 
even qualitatively, than the results of contentious litigation”); Luban, supra note 25, at 409.  
“ADR’s real strength may lie in pursuing extra-legal justice within the system” or those 
“goods or rights that are implicit in existing institutions but to which we have no legal right.” 
Luban, supra note 25, at 409. 
 32. For an explanation of types of ADR, see generally Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, 
Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), in 15 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 70 (2d ed. 2015). 
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stand in striking contrast to the limited remedial options available when 
pursuing discrete causes of action in a court.33  As a consequence, settlement 
agreements designed by parties themselves could be tailored to their needs 
and more durable than resolutions handed down as trial verdicts.34  And, the 
opportunity to have voice and to be treated with dignity by a neutral third 
party further aids parties’ sense that the outcome of an ADR process like 
mediation is fair.35  For example, studies of small claims courts suggest that 
mediation participants described their experience in small claims mediation 
as “longer, more thorough, more open, and providing greater control over 
their presentation and more opportunity to tell their side of the story” than 
litigation.36 
Finally, from a macro access to justice perspective, the flexibility of ADR 
procedural rules and their ability to incorporate nonlegal solutions means that 
these processes can respond quickly to new injustices as they arise.  For 
example, before the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges37 extended marriage 
rights to same-sex couples, married gay men and women living in 
jurisdictions that did not recognize same-sex marriage could not go to their 
local courts for a divorce.38  They either had to move to a same-sex marriage 
jurisdiction and establish residency or live separately and remain legally 
married.39  In response, same-sex marriage “dissolution mediation” emerged 
as one avenue by which same-sex couples living in jurisdictions that did not 
recognize same-sex marriage could order their lives, their children’s lives, 
and their finances when remedies from the civil legal justice system were not 
(yet) available.40  Thus, in a world of dynamic (in)justice, ADR processes 
have the potential to respond more nimbly than courts to quickly changing 
individual and societal needs.41 
 
 33. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25, at 7 (discussing the “limited remedial imagination” 
of courts). 
 34. Rosselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil 
Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 68 (2004) (discussing the studies of settlement durability). 
 35. The connection between an individual’s perception of procedural fairness and their 
assessment that they have received fair distributive justice is discussed in much of the 
procedural justice literature.  For a helpful synthesis, see Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the 
Role of Justice in Resolution:  Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52–54 (2004). 
 36. Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court:  The 
Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 335–36 (1995).  The 
study controlled for litigant characteristics to ensure that the differences in experience were 
attributable to the dispute resolution process itself and not the unique preferences of individual 
litigants. Id. at 335–37. 
 37. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 38. Judith M. Stinson, The Right to (Same-Sex) Divorce, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 447, 
447 (2011). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 465. 
 40. For a discussion of mediation for same-sex divorcing couples, see generally Frederick 
Hertz, Deborah Wald & Stacey Shuster, Integrated Approaches to Resolving Same-Sex 
Dissolutions, 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 123 (2009) and Mark J. Hanson, Moving Forward 
Together:  The LGBT Community and the Family Mediation Field, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
295, 300–03 (2006) (describing the advantages of using mediation for the LGBT community). 
 41. Cappelletti, supra note 14, at 296 (“We have to be aware of our responsibility; our 
duty is to contribute to making law and legal remedies reflect the actual needs, problems and 
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C.  Like Any Other Human Innovation, ADR Can Lead to Injustice 
In addition to observing that justice, and therefore access to justice, should 
be understood as a dynamic, moving frontier, Galanter noted that, with every 
human innovation designed to fix a problem, new problems and injustices 
unavoidably arise.42  ADR, itself a human invention, is not immune to this 
phenomenon. 
ADR processes—despite their potential to fix the problems of formal 
adjudication by offering informality, flexibility, and party-driven or 
individually tailored outcomes—introduce new forms of injustice.  Indeed, 
critics have long observed that ADR processes can exacerbate existing power 
differentials between parties.43  For example, the corporate strategy of 
shunting individual claims into private ADR processes deprives people of the 
ability to achieve systemic reform or public accountability through 
litigation.44  This corporate practice becomes even more problematic when 
powerful players write the rules for ADR processes, like binding arbitration, 
in their favor and then present them to employees and consumers within 
contracts of adhesion.45 
In addition to concerns about informality, critics also fear that the lack of 
transparency or public accountability of ADR processes erodes public law46 
and enables prejudices against women and minorities to emerge and go 
unchecked.47  Not only may the private, third-party neutrals exert 
inappropriate control over parties in ADR processes48 but parties themselves 
 
aspirations of civil society.  Among these needs are surely those of developing alternatives to 
the traditional processes and remedies any time such remedies are too expensive, slow and 
inaccessible to the people; hence, the duty to find alternatives capable of better 
accommodating the urgent demands of a time of societal transformations at an 
unprecedentedly accelerated pace.”). 
 42. Galanter, supra note 3, at 125. 
 43. The power critique is not exclusive to ADR processes and exists for litigation as well. 
See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits 
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); Rubinson, supra note 14. 
 44. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves:  How the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 196 (2003) (noting 
that litigation can be powerful for marginalized groups who otherwise have no access to 
political power).  See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:  The Public in the Private 
of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment 
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001). 
 45. See Jean Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 674–97 (1996); see also Jeff 
Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences:  An Empirical 
Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 3–5 
(2015). 
 46. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); 
Sternlight, supra note 14, at 570. 
 47. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:  Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice 
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1375–91; Trina Grillo, The 
Mediation Alternative:  Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549 (1991). 
 48. See generally Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:  What’s 
Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning 
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may feel compelled to accept less than their full legal entitlement because 
they feel pressure to be agreeable or to prioritize harmony over justice.49 
But, here again, the dynamic model of access to justice proves helpful.  
Just as ADR processes were deployed as solutions to problems in the formal 
litigation process, they created problems and exposed new needs.  
Importantly, it is not the ADR processes themselves that are unjust:  it is the 
introduction of these ADR processes into new institutions, with preexisting 
power constellations, that can lead to injustice—like an invasive species 
introduced to a new ecosystem.50  Just like any other human innovation, ADR 
process design should be continually tweaked and adjusted to respond to the 
new problems, needs, and wants that they uncover.51  The following case 
study of the foreclosure crisis illustrates how ADR processes can enhance 
access to justice and how they must also evolve to avoid further injustice. 
II.  A FORECLOSURE CRISIS CASE STUDY 
The story of ADR’s place in the foreclosure crisis offers a valuable 
illustration of how ADR can provide new pathways to access justice while 
also introducing new problems or injustices that need redress.52 
The foreclosure crisis arose from the Great Recession, which, at the time, 
was the worst financial crisis to hit the United States since the Great 
Depression.  Many factors contributed to the foreclosure crisis but at its 
epicenter was human invention:  the securitization of residential mortgages 
and the creation of a secondary mortgage market.53 
 
Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation:  The Inevitable Price of 
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001).   
 49. See generally Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly:  Divorce Mediation and the 
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the 
Practice of Law:  Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 
9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993). 
 50. Invasive species, while harmless to their ecosystems of origin, become costly and 
dangerous pests when introduced to new ecosystems where natural predators do not exist. See, 
e.g., Otago’s Annual Great Easter Bunny Hunt Under Way, N.Z. HERALD (Apr. 14, 2017, 
11:30 AM), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11838396 
[https://perma.cc/3A3S-NG55] (describing New Zealand’s “Great Easter Bunny Hunt,” in 
which people hunt invasive species such as bunnies, stoats, and ferrets).  
 51. Nussbaum, supra note 28, at 404 (advocating for mediation architecture that does not 
“surrender[] conflict to existing power constellations” (quoting Gunther Teubner, 
Juridification—Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES:  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST, AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE LAW 3, 8 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987))). 
 52. See generally Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure:  Remedying the Flaws 
of a Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889 (2013). 
 53. A full explanation of the complex network of factors leading to the Great Recession 
and the foreclosure crisis lies beyond the scope of this paper.  What follows is a streamlined 
explanation focusing on those aspects most salient to the discussion of whether or not ADR 
advances access to justice.  For an in-depth history and analysis of the Great Recession and 
the foreclosure crisis, see generally BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT:  A MEMOIR OF 
A CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH (2015). See also BEN S. BERNANKE, TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER & 
HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., FIREFIGHTING:  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS LESSONS (2019); 
HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK:  INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
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Securitization began when home loans that originated with banks were 
transformed into bonds—new securitized instruments called mortgage-
backed securities—that could be bought and sold on the stock market.54  
Federal legislation passed in the 1980s loosened regulations on this 
secondary mortgage market, spawning a host of securities derivatives and 
enabling the participation of private investment firms.55  Hundreds, if not 
thousands, of mortgages were bundled together and sliced up to create 
different securities.56 
Investment in these new mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives 
became a booming and highly lucrative business.57  Demand for more 
mortgage-backed securities in which to invest spurred the creation of novel, 
“exotic” (read:  risky) subprime mortgages.58  New financial incentives for 
loan originators meant they issued more and more mortgages,59 often to 
people who were financially incapable of performing their obligations under 
the lending agreement.60  It only took a few years for homeowners to begin 
defaulting on their mortgages, leading to an unprecedented volume of 
 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM:  THE 
CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
 54. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE:  THE HIDDEN HISTORY 
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 4–19, 258–59 (2010) (explaining the history of mortgage-backed 
securities, which were first created back in the 1970s as a way to address inefficiency and the 
lack of predictability in mortgage markets around the country, and how credit default swaps 
on mortgages became traded); see also Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1896–98 (explaining the 
rise of the secondary mortgage market). 
 55. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1897. 
 56. MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 54, at 8–9 (discussing the practice of “tranching”).  
Investors could secure an interest in different features of the bundled loans; for example, 
across the entire collection of loans, they might invest only in the interest payments or in the 
principal payments, or they could invest in the homeowners’ failures to repay and then default 
on their loans. Id. at 258–63.  See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT:  INSIDE THE 
DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) (describing dubious lenders of subprime mortgage bonds). 
 57. MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 54, at 125–37 (explaining the highly lucrative 
business of issuing subprime mortgages).  Between 1970 and 1981, the value of bonds created 
from mortgages on single-family homes went from a “standing start” to more than $350 
billion. Id. at 8.  By the end of 2001, these securities were worth more than $3.3 trillion. Id. 
 58. These “exotic” loan products include hybrid adjustable-rate mortgage loans (ARMs), 
option ARMs, balloon loans, interest-only loans, and deferred interest loans or negative 
amortization loans. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1903 n.51.  
 59. The secondary mortgage market led to an “originate-to-distribute” model in which 
mortgage brokers originated loans and then sold them to securitizing institutions, which in 
turn sold them to investors. Christopher J. Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults 3–4 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 2008-59, 2008), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2008/200859/200859pap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YAT5-J98E].  Mortgage brokers were paid for every new loan generated 
and, because they felt none of the financial loss if a borrower defaulted, brokers had no 
incentive to screen borrowers carefully and every incentive to approve more loans. Id. at 3. 
 60. Subprime mortgages were targeted at people with bad credit, minimal savings, an 
unwillingness or inability to provide documentation of savings and income, and even at racial 
minorities who qualified for less expensive loans. See, e.g., Winnie F. Taylor, Eliminating 
Racial Discrimination in the Subprime Mortgage Market:  Proposals for Fair Lending 
Reform, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 263, 272–74 (2009). 
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foreclosures, the collapse of the housing market, and the evisceration of 
trillions of dollars in investments.61 
To borrow the terminology of Galanter’s theory of dynamic (in)justice and 
access to justice, the human capacity for invention introduced new and risky 
real estate investment practices that unleashed a host of new problems that 
the existing legal system could not redress.  The result was mass injustice.62 
A.  Foreclosing in the Secondary Mortgage Market:  New Frontiers of 
Injustice 
Managing the high volume of foreclosures in a post–secondary mortgage 
market world was truly a new frontier to which existing foreclosure laws and 
procedures were ill-equipped to respond.  Foreclosure practices in a post–
secondary mortgage market world operate very differently than they do in 
the primary mortgage market world, the world for which the substantive and 
procedural foreclosure laws on the books in 2008 were designed. 
Historically, when a prospective homeowner sought a loan to buy a house, 
he would go to his local bank and request a loan.  The bank issued the loan 
and, in exchange, the borrower signed a promissory note granting the bank a 
mortgage interest in the house as collateral for the loan.63  The bank would 
keep the loan on its books, issuing monthly billing statements and collecting 
payments.64  If a borrower failed to make payments and defaulted on the loan, 
the lender could exercise its legal right to foreclose—take title to the property 
and sell it to recoup the value of the loan—or it could negotiate an alternative 
to foreclosure.65  These alternatives to foreclosure included restructuring the 
loan or changing the payment schedule so that the loan could “re-perform,” 
with the homeowner remaining in the house and continuing to make 
payments, thereby mitigating the lender’s losses and shielding the 
homeowner from the financial damage of a foreclosure.66  Presumably, a 
lender would have to conduct a careful cost-benefit analysis to determine 
whether foreclosure or some other loss mitigation would yield the most 
value.  That analysis was a unique assessment based on the homeowner’s 
 
 61. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1904–06. 
 62. Some of the causes of the foreclosure crisis, however, were not new or never-before-
seen, such as racism, fraud, and predatory lending.  Communities of color were targeted with 
subprime loans. Taylor, supra note 60, at 272–74.  People were defrauded into signing up for 
new subprime mortgages and real estate appraisals were fraudulently inflated to increase the 
amount of the loan for which homeowners qualified. MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 54, at 
207–08. 
 63. See Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1893–96. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Alternatives could include renegotiating the terms of the loan that would enable the 
homeowner to remain in the home, making regular mortgage payments, or choosing another 
way for the lender to take title to the home without having to initiate foreclosure, such as a 
short sale or a deed in lieu of foreclosure, so-called “non-retention” alternatives to foreclosure. 
See Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1893–96; see also DARRYL E. GETTER & N. ERIC WEISS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34232, THE PROCESS, DATA, AND COSTS OF MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE 1 (2008), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20081020_RL34232_ 
ca7cd14c3c1dd6baedd148c2d9a48327722a17e8.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E3Y-KH4P].  
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individual financial situation, the market value of the home, and the 
particulars of the loan agreement. 
In a post–secondary mortgage market world, however, this direct 
relationship changed dramatically because securitization separates 
ownership from the management of the loan.67  Instead of a single-lender 
entity that is financially invested in the performance of the loan, the 
investment interest is held by a trust that serves an array of nameless and 
faceless market investors.68  These market investors cannot communicate 
directly with homeowners or renegotiate the terms of the loan so that it meets 
their shared financial interests.69 
To bridge the gap between borrowers and investors, securitization 
introduces a third-party agent, a loan servicer.  The loan servicer bears 
responsibility for managing homeowners’ loans and serves as the only point 
of contact for the homeowner.70  When a loan becomes delinquent, the loan 
servicer, in theory, conducts a cost-benefit analysis of whether to foreclose 
or to work out an alternative arrangement with the borrower to minimize the 
investors’ losses.71 
In practice, loan servicers’ behavior led to serious, unforeseen 
consequences.  Loan servicers were financially incentivized to foreclose and 
relied on automated practices rather than case-by-case loss mitigation 
assessments to do so.72  The lack of communication and transparency from 
this automated business model further compounded the problem.73  As a 
result, homeowners faced unnecessary foreclosures or foreclosures that were 
not in investors’ financial interests, especially as the foreclosure crisis 
expanded and the housing market collapsed.74  The economic consequences 
to homeowners, communities, and investors proved astronomical.  
Homeowners lost more than $2.6 trillion due to foreclosures and 
neighborhoods and communities lost additional trillions.75  The stock market 
 
 67. See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 16 
(2011). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. The loan servicer “issues monthly statements, collects homeowner’s payments, places 
funds in escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, remits funds to investors, calculates the 
interest rate adjustments for [subprime mortgages], and reports to national credit bureaus.” 
Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1898. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1899–900. 
 73. Stories abound about communication breakdowns between homeowners and loan 
servicer representatives. See id. at 1901–02 & nn.39–50. 
 74. Id. at 1904–06. 
 75. Id. at 1905–06 & nn.58–65.  Neighborhoods with high rates of foreclosure saw 
decreased property values, not to mention the nuisances associated with vacant properties and 
blight. Id. at 1906 n.63.  “Local governments [lost] tax revenue and also [had] increased costs 
associated with unpaid sewer and water bills and building code violations from unmaintained 
properties.” Id. 
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lost more than $8 trillion in value, wiping out many Americans’ pension and 
retirement accounts.76 
As the foreclosure crisis expanded, it became clear that the existing legal 
framework could not adequately respond to the injustices caused by loan 
servicer behavior.  Foreclosures in nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions, 
which allow lenders to foreclose without first obtaining a court order, went 
forward with little to no regulatory oversight.  In judicial foreclosure 
jurisdictions, courts were overwhelmed with automated foreclosure filings.  
Florida’s Twentieth Judicial District created a “rocket docket” to plow 
through a docket of more than one thousand foreclosure cases per day.77  
Many petitions lacked necessary documentation or included robo-signed 
affidavits.78  It proved impossible for judges to assess accurately the merits 
of foreclosure petitions signed by robots and to ensure compliance with state 
law. 
Not only was the integrity of judicial proceedings compromised but, there 
were also gaps in substantive standards for foreclosure.  For example, to meet 
the legal requirements for foreclosure, loan servicers did not have to submit 
a cost-benefit analysis demonstrating that the investors’ financial interests 
were served by foreclosure rather than a foreclosure alternative.79  
Foreclosure petitions also did not require the loan servicer to demonstrate 
that the mortgage had not been obtained through fraud.80 
Courts were not alone in their inability to provide the oversight needed to 
put a check on the injustices of the foreclosure crisis; other regulators were 
similarly stymied.  States could not pass blanket legislation to end 
foreclosures entirely, to void subprime mortgages, or to require all mortgages 
be rewritten to reflect new market realities.81  Needless to say, even if these 
regulatory interventions were possible, it would take months or years for the 
state or the federal government to craft and enact appropriate legislation, 
which would be little comfort to homeowners facing imminent foreclosure.  
 
 76. Renae Merle, A Guide to the Financial Crisis—10 Years Later, WASH. POST (Sept. 
10, 2018, 1:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-guide-to-the-
financial-crisis--10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8-a20b-
5f4f84429666_story.html [https://perma.cc/XL8C-XQMV]. 
 77. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1906–07 & nn.66–69. 
 78. Id. at 1907 & n.69. 
 79. Id. at 1907. 
 80. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis 
Worse, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/how-
mortgage-fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html [https://perma.cc/C2YM-BFDR] 
(discussing how the fraudulent practice of overstating borrowers’ income to obtain larger 
loans contributed to the foreclosure crisis). 
 81. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1907–08.  States did enact statutes imposing moratoria 
on foreclosures after the robo-signing scandal was uncovered (although these moratoria did 
not stop the piling up of fees and penalties on homeowners in default). Id. at 1907 nn.69–70.  
But other regulation was constitutionally prohibited. Id. at 1907 n.71.  Foreclosure is a lawful 
contractual remedy for lenders so, under the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, federal and state governments could not retroactively regulate existing 
mortgage contract terms. Id.  And, because of securitization, foreclosure became a national 
economic activity that states, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, also could not regulate. See 
id. 
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Confronted with this crisis, state judiciaries and legislators turned to ADR 
for help. 
B.  An ADR Response to Injustice 
The characteristics of ADR processes discussed above82—their 
informality, ability to provide structure and organization for negotiations, 
capacity for direct communication and nonbinary, personalized remedies not 
available in law—made them advantageous for responding to the urgent and 
unprecedented injustices of the foreclosure crisis. 
State legislatures and courts across the country created foreclosure 
mediation or settlement conference programs (collectively, “foreclosure 
ADR programs”)—all with different structures and program designs—to 
respond to the problems associated with securitized loan servicing and the 
foreclosure crisis.83  In their most basic form, these foreclosure ADR 
programs brought homeowners and loan servicer representatives together for 
a discussion of the loan, any loss-mitigation options, or alternatives to 
foreclosure.  These foreclosure ADR programs provided a time, place, and 
manner for the parties to meet and negotiate—an opportunity that did not 
previously exist in either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions.  
Lawmakers could not prescribe outcomes of the negotiations ahead of time 
by requiring foreclosure avoidance.84  But they did hope that, in bringing the 
parties together for a face-to-face meeting, the communication barriers 
caused by securitization could be resolved.  Loan servicers would have to 
demonstrate good reasons to foreclose and homeowners could learn about 
their legal rights and obligations.  Through these programs, the hope was that 
some homeowners could avoid foreclosure, to their personal benefit and to 
the benefit of the wider community.85 
Perhaps the greatest, most powerful contribution that foreclosure ADR 
made in the effort to push back against the injustices of the foreclosure crisis 
was to interrupt loan servicing automation and correct some of the loan 
servicing industry’s appalling communication problems.  Not only did 
foreclosure ADR establish a time and place for a meeting between lender 
representatives and homeowners but it also compelled a person—a real 
human being—“with a name, phone number, email address, and the authority 
to [re]negotiate the terms of the loan, to materialize and [provide 
 
 82. See supra Part I.B. 
 83. For ad nauseam detail about the varying features of different jurisdictions’ programs, 
see Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1915–50. 
 84. For an explanation of constitutional limitations, see supra note 81. 
 85. See Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1909. 
The objectives of foreclosure ADR programs included:  1) resolv[ing] 
communication barriers caused by securitization; 2) provid[ing] oversight of loan 
servicers’ conduct; 3) educat[ing] homeowners about their rights and 
responsibilities; 4) assist[ing] with a high volume of cases in court, and 5) 
alleviat[ing] community blight [by helping more families stay in their homes]. 
Id. 
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individualized assessment of] foreclosure alternatives.”86  With a time and 
date certain, parties could exchange current documents (pay stubs, divorce 
decrees, bankruptcy filings, rental agreements, etc.) and have direct, 
structured negotiations that otherwise would never have occurred.87  
Foreclosure ADR programs became the forum in which loan servicers could 
conduct an individualized, transparent cost-benefit analysis to determine 
whether, given the homeowners’ finances and the circumstances of the local 
housing market, it was in the investors’ best interests to modify the loan or 
to recoup some of the loan value by selling the home.88 
Foreclosure ADR processes also enabled parties to explore creative 
alternatives to foreclosure at a time when homeowners had few, if any, 
available legal remedies.  In mediation, loan servicers and homeowners could 
discuss the homeowners’ abilities to cure the default—perhaps due to new 
employment—or negotiate a restructuring of the loan terms, as well as 
whether any alternatives to foreclosure were possible.89  Even if there were 
no way for homeowners to remain in the home and make payments under a 
modified loan agreement, they could still negotiate with the servicers for an 
alternative to foreclosure that had a less negative impact on their credit, such 
as a deed in lieu or a short sale.90  If those alternatives were not options, 
homeowners could also negotiate with the loan servicer to delay foreclosure 
for a few months until a child finished the school year or a homeowner 
became eligible for Social Security or Medicare.91 
Furthermore, with new federal regulations coming out on a monthly basis, 
foreclosure ADR programs became the vehicle through which these 
regulations could be implemented and applied to individual homeowners.  
For example, starting in 2009, the federal government required loan servicers 
to comply with new loan modification and loan refinancing standards and 
 
 86. Id. at 1914–15. 
 87. GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE 
MEDIATION PROGRAMS:  CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 12 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/ 
pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-state-mediation-programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QS3E-QU46]. (“For housing counselors the programs provided a structure for negotiations.  
This structure saved time in establishing lines of communication with servicers. . . .  Most 
mediation programs are designed to focus on financial calculations for workout agreements 
and loan modifications . . . .  Attorneys who found foreclosure mediation programs helpful 
almost uniformly considered their major benefit to be in giving the attorney and the 
homeowner much-needed time to investigate the facts of a client’s case.”). 
 88. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1947–50.  A loan servicer might determine that, for a 
house in Las Vegas, Nevada, which was one of the places that saw the greatest drop in home 
values during the foreclosure crisis, investors would see more value were the loan to be 
modified and the homeowner to continue to make payments than if the loan servicer were to 
foreclose and get very little value on resale. 
 89. See, e.g., Foreclosure Mediation Program, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/foreclosure/homeowner_qs.htm [https://perma.cc/YG4A-GSKQ] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Foreclosure Mediation FAQs, CLERMONT COUNTY OHIO, 
https://clermontcommonpleas.com/faqs-and-more/foreclosure-mediation-faqs/ 
[https://perma.cc/G2LB-RRJX] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 90. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 91. These examples come from real foreclosure mediations that I observed in Maryland’s 
foreclosure mediation program. 
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procedures.92  For a variety of reasons, blanket mandates for modification or 
refinancing were unfeasible.  Thus, mediation sessions became the vehicle 
by which new federal regulations could be implemented for one homeowner 
at a time. 
C.  Foreclosure ADR Design Needed to Evolve 
While ADR processes corrected for some of the injustices presented by the 
foreclosure crisis, they also introduced new ones.  Foreclosure ADR did not 
operate in a vacuum—it was introduced into a setting with systemic 
communication problems, lack of transparency, and preexisting power 
differentials between homeowners and loan servicers, all of which raised 
serious concerns about the prospect of foreclosure mediation. 
Many consumer protection advocates argued that sending unrepresented, 
uninformed, or unsophisticated homeowners into their first and only 
negotiation with a “repeat-player”93 loan servicer representative, who was 
also an attorney, was grossly unfair.94  First, the disparities between the 
parties in experience, bargaining power, and emotional investment in the 
foreclosure decision were stark.95  Second, the loan servicing industry’s 
automation, lack of transparency, and incentive to foreclose rather than 
modify loans,96 particularly in the first half of the foreclosure crisis, meant 
that they did not buy in to the idea of sitting down to negotiate with 
homeowners.97  Taken together, these factors created an environment that 
 
 92. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable 
Refinance Program (HARP) are two of the components of the Homeowner Affordability and 
Stability Plan rolled out by the Obama administration that took effect in 2009. Programs, 
HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/ 
index.jsp [https://perma.cc/H6NF-MGZJ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).  Both programs 
incentivized loan servicers to restructure home mortgages for eligible homeowners who were 
either behind in payments or in default. Id.  Under HAMP, loan servicers modified the terms 
of the loan so that a homeowner’s monthly payments were no greater than 31 percent of her 
gross monthly income. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-367R, TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:  RESULTS OF HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY ON BORROWERS’ 
EXPERIENCES WITH THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 3 (2011), https:// 
www.gao.gov/assets/100/97516.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG3E-BKY9].  All loan servicers that 
received federal bailout money through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were 
required to participate in HAMP. 
 93. Galanter, supra note 43, at 97–98 (explaining “repeat players” as a type of party 
involved in dispute resolution processes). 
 94. For discussion of the consumer protection and access to justice concerns around 
foreclosure mediation, see generally MELANCA CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION:  EMERGING RESEARCH AND EVALUATION PRACTICES (2011), https:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atj/legacy/2012/01/05/foreclosure-mediation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2VD-GJSB]. 
 95. See WALSH, supra note 87, at 12 (describing a “take it or leave it” approach from loan 
servicers). 
 96. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1901–02. 
 97. Natalie Sherman, State’s Foreclosure Mediation Lacks Teeth, Advocate Say, BALT. 
SUN (Dec. 20, 2013, 10:53 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/bs-bz-foreclosure-20131219-
story.html [https://perma.cc/3RND-AVTZ] (quoting one Legal Aid attorney who described 
the “runaround many homeowners faced in dealing with lenders and the companies that 
service mortgages” because the loan servicers were dragging their feet on modifications). 
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could make mediation a waste of time and, even worse, intimidate or harm 
homeowners.98 
In response to these consumer protection concerns, some foreclosure ADR 
programs evolved to include design improvements as countermeasures for 
the injustices they introduced.99  For example, to help homeowners with their 
negotiations, many jurisdictions used mediation as the hook to which housing 
counseling or legal services attached, requiring a meeting with a housing 
counselor or attorney prior to attending mediation or creating buttressing 
representation-in-mediation assistance programs.100  To compel loan servicer 
transparency and good behavior, jurisdictions wrote mediation rules 
requiring pre-mediation document exchanges101 and enumerating 
sanctionable offenses and corresponding penalties.102  Some programs 
required third-party mediators to ensure that loan servicers could prove 
ownership of the mortgage note and, once they did so, lead the parties 
through a checklist of topics for discussion; the checklist was then signed and 
filed with the program administrator to attest that all alternatives to 
foreclosure were discussed and examined, along with any rationales for why 
these alternatives were accepted or rejected.103  Other jurisdictions designed 
their foreclosure mediation programs to require loan servicers to complete an 
analysis104 of eligibility for these loan modification programs prior to the 
 
 98. NABANITA PAL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FACING FORECLOSURE ALONE:  THE 
CONTINUING CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION (2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Facing_Foreclosure_Alone.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XP2-
Q36S]. 
 99. Some jurisdictions, like Florida, decided to shutter their foreclosure mediation 
programs altogether due to a lack of buy-in from loan servicing and consumer advocacy 
constituencies.  For a discussion of the challenges that the Florida program faced, see generally 
Sharon Press, Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation in Florida—Implementation Challenges for 
an Institutionalized Program, 11 NEV. L.J. 306 (2011). 
 100. Nussbaum, supra note 52, at 1938–41 (explaining the role of housing counselors and 
the different approaches programs take to connecting homeowners to housing counselors and 
legal representation). 
 101. Id. at 1941–44 (detailing the pre-mediation discovery and document exchange built 
into some foreclosure ADR program designs). 
 102. Id. at 1944–47 (identifying the available sanctions and penalties, ranging from 
monetary to procedural). 
 103. Id. at 1932–36 (discussing mediators’ roles and responsibilities, including filing 
mediator reports and monitoring parties for good-faith participation).  Of course, these 
administrative reporting requirements can sometimes create tension with mediation 
confidentiality protections and therefore raise questions about whether a confidential process 
like mediation is in fact the appropriate venue for business-consumer negotiations demanding 
more public oversight.  Connecticut’s foreclosure program asks mediators to report on the 
reasonableness of loan servicers’ decisions to deny homeowners’ requests for foreclosure 
alternatives. Foreclosure Mediation Program, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/fmp/FMP_pie.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ9H-7JGH] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020).  Making such a report requires a mediator with background knowledge 
and information about each individual case to evaluate the decision. 
 104. Called a “net-present-value” calculation, this analysis examines whether it is more 
lucrative for investors to foreclose immediately and recoup the value of the loan through a 
foreclosure sale or whether investors would make more money in the long run if the 
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mediation so that the parties could enter the mediation prepared to discuss 
prospects for the homeowner to remain in the home. 
Just like many other human inventions, foreclosure ADR was deployed to 
fix one set of injustices but resulted in new ones.  A series of important 
adjustments to the procedural architecture of foreclosure ADR programs—
designed to level the playing field and increase accountability—helped to 
correct for some of the new injustices they introduced. 
CONCLUSION 
The foreclosure ADR case study demonstrates how inserting ADR into 
foreclosure procedures helped avoid unnecessary foreclosures in the midst of 
a spiraling crisis.105  Foreclosure ADR was not a silver bullet that could end 
all the injustices of foreclosure crisis.  It could not address the systemic 
contributing factors such as fraud, predatory lending, and overleveraged 
banks106 but it was an important part of responding to the needs of individual 
homeowners facing foreclosure.  Foreclosure mediations forged new lines of 
communication in what had become a triangulated relationship involving 
homeowners, secondary mortgage market investors, and third-party loan 
servicers.107  Instead of automated decision-making, homeowners and loan 
servicers in foreclosure ADR programs could assess the viability of the loan 
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began in 2008, 71 percent of homeowners participating in foreclosure mediation have retained 
their homes and 16 percent have negotiated a “graceful exit” from their homes, resulting in 87 
percent of mediation settlements using foreclosure alternatives. See Foreclosure Mediation 
Program, supra note 103.  Maine reports a 62 percent settlement rate for cases mediated in its 
foreclosure program from 2010 to 2017. FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM, STATE OF ME. 
JUDICIAL BRANCH, REPORT TO THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL 
AFFAIRS AND THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 5 (2019), https:// 
www.courts.maine.gov/reports_pubs/reports/pdf/fdp_2018_ar.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WVX-
XYL9].  Washington State reports that, from 2011 to 2018, 49 percent of mediation sessions 
resulted in agreements (borrowers remaining in the home in 78 percent of settled cases and 
leaving the home with a negotiated alternative to foreclosure in 22 percent of settled cases). 
See LISA BROWN, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FORECLOSURE FAIRNESS PROGRAM:  
ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 30 fig.9 (2019), http://www.commerce.wa.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Commerce-Foreclosure-Fairness.pdf [https://perma.cc/AGC4-
5HDB].  Additionally, surveys of homeowners who remained in their homes as a result of 
foreclosure mediation found that 95 percent were still in their homes and had not defaulted. 
See id.  Cook County, Illinois reports 70 percent of homeowners participating in the county 
foreclosure mediation program avoided foreclosure, with 67 percent of those agreements 
resulting in a loan modification where the homeowners remained in the home. STATE OF ILL. 
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 106. To address these problems, we needed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, new federal 
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in real time, curing defaults where possible or negotiating so-called graceful 
exits.  Additionally, this new procedural step enabled individual homeowners 
to access ancillary supports such as legal assistance and housing counseling. 
The story of the foreclosure crisis and ADR response also illustrates 
Galanter’s important insight that justice and injustice are dynamic and, 
therefore, so must be our pathways to justice.  ADR processes, with their 
unique flexibility and adaptability in both rules and outcomes, are 
particularly well suited to serve as some of these pathways in a dynamic 
system of (in)justice. 
However, as the foreclosure ADR story further demonstrates, ADR 
processes, like any other human innovation, can spawn new problems and 
injustices.  These injustices emerge not because ADR processes themselves 
are unjust but because they do not operate in a vacuum.  Like litigation, ADR 
processes echo the power differentials of the ecosystem in which they are 
introduced.108  The adaptability and flexibility of ADR processes mean that 
they can—and should—evolve.  Procedural architecture should be designed 
according to the contexts in which they are introduced to avoid enhancing or 
exacerbating power differentials.109 
So, to answer the Symposium question of whether ADR achieves access 
to justice, I reply:  “Yes.  And . . . .”110  Yes, ADR processes can offer parties 
new pathways to just remedies not (yet) available in the existing legal system.  
And, in order to avoid generating injustice themselves, ADR processes must 
continue to innovate and adapt in response to the “expanding social and legal 
universe” in which they operate.111 
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